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Abstract
In a recent article in this journal Simon-Tuval, Horev and Kaplan argue that in order to improve the protection of
consumers there might be a need to impose a threshold on the medical loss ratio (MLR) for voluntary health
insurance (VHI) in Israel [1]. Their argument is that VHI in Israel covers several essential services that are not covered
by the mandatory benefits package due to budget constraints, while there are market failures in the VHI market
that justify regulation to assure consumer protection such as high accessibility to high quality coverage.
In this commentary it will be argued that in addition to market failures there are also government failures. It is doubtful
whether imposing a threshold on MLR is effective because of government failures. It can be even counter-productive.
Therefore, alternative regulatory measures are discussed to promote the protection of the beneficiaries.
If essential services covered by VHI are unaffordable for some low-income people, government can extend the current
mandatory basic health insurance so that it covers all essential services. If there is a budget restriction, the amount of
government funds could be increased, or the health plans could be allowed to request an additional flat rate premium,
set by them and to be paid by the consumer directly to their health plan. Also, effective out-of-pocket payments could
be introduced. Subsidies could be given to low-income people to compensate for their additional expenses under the
mandatory health insurance. If these changes are adopted, then the government would no longer be held responsible
for access to benefits outside the mandatory health insurance. Accordingly, all VHI could be sold on the normal free
insurance market, just as other types of indemnity insurance.
In addition, the Israeli health insurance and healthcare markets could be made more competitive by introducing
procompetitive regulation. This would increase the efficiency and affordability of healthcare.
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Background
Simon-Tuval, Horev and Kaplan (SHK) argue that in
order to improve the protection of consumers there
might be a need to impose a threshold on the medical
loss ratio (MLR) for voluntary health insurance (VHI) in
Israel [1]. Their argument is that VHI in Israel covers
several essential services that are not covered by the
mandatory benefits package due to budget constraints,
while there are market failures in the VHI market that
justify regulation to assure consumer protection (which
includes ensuring broad accessibility to high quality
coverage). They present empirical findings about the
MLR of several types of VHI in Israel and conclude that
"consistent low levels of MLR are observed". Therefore,
SHK argue, there might be a need to increase the extent
of regulation of VHI, in particular by imposing a mini-
mum MLR threshold.
SHK rightly conclude that regulation is necessary in order
to assure access to essential healthcare services, but they
incorrectly conclude that a threshold on the medical loss
ratio is the right regulation. In this paper I will first argue
that in addition to market failures there are also govern-
ment failures and that it is doubtful whether imposing a
threshold on MLR is effective because of government
failures. Second, I will discuss alternative regulatory mea-
sures to improve access to essential healthcare services.
What is the problem to be solved?
SHK mention the following characteristics and market
failures of private health insurance markets that (may)
necessitate the implementation of effective regulation:
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the desire to protect beneficiaries (such as ensuring high
accessibility to quality coverage), information deficien-
cies, limited competition, moral hazard, adverse selec-
tion, low MLRs, concerns about insurers’ solvency, and a
negative influence of private health insurance on the
publicly financed health sector (e.g. unequal competition
for human resources, and inefficient duplication of the
services). Although it is clear from the ‘Tinbergen rule’
[2] that each policy objective should be addressed by a
single tool (or, alternatively, for each policy objective
there should be at least one tool), it is not clear which
specific policy objective SHK aim to achieve by imple-
menting a MLR. I assume their objective is to achieve
access, for a fair price, to the essential services that are
currently not covered by the mandatory benefits package
due to budget constraints1.
Potential government failures
Although implementing a threshold on MLR seems an
easy type of regulation, the regulator can easily make
mistakes in the implementation, which can make a
threshold on MLR ineffective or even counterproductive.
A major problem is that it is hard to interpret an
MLR. Is a low level of MLR an indicator of efficiency
(low medical expenses due to good managed care) or
inefficiency (high administrative expenses and waste)?
[3] Robinson argues that valid interpretation of MLR is
very difficult because the value of the MLR depends on
several characteristics, such as the relationship between
the health plan and the providers (vertical structure), the
range of networks and utilization management systems
it offers (product diversification), the range of buyers
(individual or group insurance) to which it markets its
services (channel diversification) and its geographic
scope [3]. In addition SHK indicate that the MLR may
strongly depend on the type of services (low layer or
high layer of VHI), the number of years the product is
already sold on the market (because of waiting times be-
fore reimbursement), the presence or absence of a guar-
anteed renewal of the contract and the size of the
insurer [2]. Furthermore there are different, often incon-
sistent and sometimes arbitrary accounting rules used to
calculate the MLR [3].
Another problem is the effect of a threshold on MLR
on the insurers’ behavior. Karaca-Mandic et al. argue
that insurers’ reactions may involve both strategic and
unintended responses [4]. Insurers may have incentives
to re-label some of their administrative expenses as qual-
ity improvement expenses (‘medical expenses’) which
increases their MLR. The MLR regulation may also result
in reduced cost containment efforts because insures may
have less incentive to pursue efficient utilization manage-
ment or to negotiate as hard on provider reimbursement
after premiums are set [4].
Given such a complex relationship between the charac-
teristics of an insurance product and the MLR, the ques-
tion is whether the regulator has sufficient information,
knowledge and expertise to set an adequate level of MLR.
One can easily imagine that there is a substantial probabil-
ity that the regulator sets the threshold inadequately. If
the regulator sets the threshold too low, it is ineffective.
But if the regulator sets the threshold too high, the con-
sequences can be dramatic. In the worst case scenario
insurers can go bankrupt due to the penalty they have to
pay or because they do not dare to increase their
premium. Other consequences can be a reduction of the
benefits, quality skimping, risk selection (if that is an
efficient way of reducing medical expenses while keeping
the premium equal) and unfair competition between
insurers with heterogeneous characteristics.
In short, in addition to the existence of market failures
the implementation of a threshold for the MLR may result
in serious government failures with adverse effects.
Alternative solutions and forms of regulation
This raises the question: are there better and more effect-
ive solutions to the problem? To achieve affordability of
the essential services that are currently not covered by the
mandatory benefits package due to budget constraints
(the policy goal), one can think of the following two alter-
native potential solutions: (1) extend the basic benefits
package and (2) improve efficiency and affordability in the
market for basic health insurance by procompetitive regu-
lation to make this market more competitive.
First, the mandatory benefits package can be extended
with all essential benefits. Consequently all VHI can be
sold on the normal free insurance market, just as other
types of indemnity insurance (such as car insurance and
theft insurance). This is how the health insurance mar-
kets in the Netherlands are regulated. The view of the
Dutch government is that because all essential benefits
(i.e. benefits that are necessary, effective, cost-effective
and cannot be left to the individual responsibility [5])
are included in the mandatory basic health insurance,
government can no longer be held responsible for access
to benefits outside the mandatory health insurance.
Budget constraints for the mandatory benefits package
can be solved by (1) increasing the amount of govern-
ment funds available to finance the basic benefits pack-
age, either by increasing the earmarked health tax or by
increasing funding out of general revenues (e.g. by
increasing the annual allocation for adding new tech-
nologies to the benefits package); (2) introducing a flat
rated premium set by each plan and to be paid directly
by the insured to the chosen health plan (which increases
premium competition among the health plans in Israel);
and (3) expanding cost-sharing (deductibles, copayments,
coinsurance), which both reduces moral hazard (and
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thereby reduces medical expenses) and shifts a part of the
public expenses to private expenses. Children could be
exempted from these measures. Low-income households
can be subsidized to compensate for their additional ex-
penses under the mandatory health insurance. The total
public payments to the health plans plus these subsidies
could be determined by the public budget constraints.
Second, efficiency and affordability on the market
for basic health insurance can be improved by intro-
ducing procompetitive regulation. Although the Israeli
healthcare system is often characterized as an example
of the ‘managed competition model’, a comparative
analysis of countries with competitive healthcare mar-
kets showed that several essential preconditions for
efficiency and affordability are not (yet) fulfilled in the
Israeli healthcare system [6]. In particular, Israel could
improve the contestability of the market for basic
health insurance and the hospital markets. Currently it
is impossible or very hard to establish a new health
plan in Israel or to set up a new hospital. The well-
known phrase ‘Four are few; six are many’ is very
applicable to the Israeli health plan market [7]. In
addition there is no competition regulation that for-
bids anticompetitive behavior and cartels in the
healthcare sector (both health plans and providers of
healthcare). The competiveness of the provider mar-
kets can be substantially improved by the publication
of transparent and easily understandable information
on the quality of the care (and Israel has indeed begun
to take steps in this direction). Inefficient risk selec-
tion by health plans can be substantially reduced by
strongly improving the risk equalization system in the
health plan market (which is currently primitive, from
an international perspective). The implementation of a
flat rate premium to be set by each health plan in-
creases price competition among the health plans.
Another advantage of allowing flat rate premiums is
that health plans that provide above average quality of
healthcare and therefore have above average expenses,
will not go bankrupt, but can request a higher pre-
mium. In conjunction with these requests, the regula-
tor could require the insurers to provide public
information on their MLR and profits. In addition they
can explain why their MLR is high or low and how
they allocate their profits (premium rebates, solvency,
extra benefits, or better quality of healthcare, etc.).
And finally the consumer could be given more choice
options of mandatory health insurance products and
more ease of switching. All these measures can im-
prove efficiency and affordability in healthcare by
reducing health expenses while maintaining the qual-
ity of care, and thereby making it easier to meet the
public budget constraints for the mandatory basic
health insurance.
Conclusion
Simon-Tuval, Horev and Kaplan (SHK) [1] incorrectly
conclude that a threshold on the medical loss ratio
(MLR) is the right regulation to assure consumer protec-
tion such as broad accessibility to high quality coverage.
It is doubtful whether imposing a threshold on MLR
would be effective because of government failures that
may occur.
If essential services covered by VHI are unaffordable for
some low-income people, government can extend the
current mandatory basic health insurance so that it covers
all essential services. If there is a budget restriction, the
amount of government funds could be increased, or the
health plans could be allowed to request an additional flat
rate premium, set by them and to be paid by the
consumer directly to their health plan. Also effective out-
of-pocket payments could be introduced. Subsidies could
be given to low-income people to compensate for their
additional expenses under the mandatory health insur-
ance. If these conditions are met, then government can no
longer be held responsible for access to benefits outside
the mandatory health insurance. Accordingly, all VHI can
be sold on the normal free insurance market, just as other
types of indemnity insurance. Because regulation of a
competitive health insurance market is very complex, it is
better to have one type of good and effective regulation
for all essential benefits, rather than two types of different
and potentially ineffective regulations (one for mandatory
basic health insurance, and one apart for VHI).
In addition, the Israeli health insurance and healthcare
markets could be made more competitive by introducing
procompetitive regulation. This would increase the
efficiency and affordability of healthcare.
Commentary on
Simon-Tuval T, Horev T, Kaplan G. Medical loss ratio as a
potential regulatory tool in the Israeli healthcare system.
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Endnotes
1Consequently other objectives should be achieved by
other types of regulation, such as e.g. enforcing the
provision of transparent information (to reduce informa-
tion deficiencies), antitrust policy and making the market
contestable (to make the market more competitive), cost-
sharing (to reduce moral hazard), allowing risk-rated
premiums (to reduce adverse selection), solvency require-
ments (to prevent insolvency), and improving the quality
of care in the public sector (to prevent negative effects of
private health insurance on the public sector).
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